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Abstract We investigate the relationship between a thousand-year history of violent
conflict in Europe and various reconstructions of temperature and precipitation.
We find that conflict was more intense during colder period, just like Zhang
et al. (Clim Change 76:459–477, 2006) found for China. This relationship weakens
in the industrialized era, and is not robust to the details of the climate reconstruction
or to the sample period. As the correlation is negative and weakening, it appears
that global warming would not lead to an increase in violent conflict in temperature
climates.
1 Introduction
In the gloomier scenarios of climate change, violent conflict plays a key part. War
would break out over declining water resources, and millions of refugees would
cause mayhem. The Nobel Peace Prize of 2007 was partly awarded to the IPCC
and Al Gore for their contribution to slowing climate change and thus preventing
war. Scenarios of climate-change-induced violence can be painted with abandon
(e.g., Schwartz and Randall 2003), because there is in fact very little research to
either support or refute such claims. The broader literature on violent conflict and
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environmental scarcity suggests that climate change would at most be a contributing
factor to violent conflict, but no attempts have been made to quantify these insights
and apply it to climate change. Zhang et al. (2006) broke new ground. They construct
a dataset of climate and violent conflict for China for the last millennium, and show
that the Chinese are more inclined to fight each other when it is cold. They link this
to reduced agricultural productivity. Here, we replicate their research for Europe,
for which similar data are available.
Research into the determinants of violent conflict has concluded that resource
scarcity is at best a contributing factor to, but never a cause of war (Alesina and
Spolaore 2005; Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2005; Homer-Dixon 1991, 1994; Homer-
Dixon et al. 1993; Maxwell and Reuveny 2000; Nordås and Gleditsch 2007). The
corollary is that climate-change-induced resource scarcity would not lead to war
either, although it may intensify pre-existing conflicts.
Clearly, an intensification of conflict would be something to worry about.
Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2005) find that political instability (i.e., the chance of
war) reduces per capita economic growth in the poorest countries by 2% per year—
although actual war has no significant effect in their model. Conflict may thus be a
big factor in the economic impacts of climate change (cf. Tol et al. 2000), but, as
said, it is not clear whether climate change would lead to conflict. Barnett (2006)
argues that conflict directly increases vulnerability—conflict also indirectly increases
vulnerability through its adverse impact on development (Yohe and Tol 2002).
Despite the conclusions of studies quoted above, it is possible to imagine a
scenario in which climate change does cause violent conflict. One example may be
prolonged drought, perhaps in the Horn of Africa (Held et al. 2006), followed by
mass migration. The impact on conflict is speculative. Firstly, migration is the result
from a complex of push and pull factors, not from a single push factor (McGregor
1994; McLeman and Smit 2006). Secondly, drought is only a real problem for
the poor; a scenario like this would happen only if warming and drying outpace
development. If not, food imports (Reilly and Schimmelpfennig 1999) or desalination
(Zhou and Tol 2005) may be the preferred options. Thirdly, drought is a slow-onset
disaster. It may exhaust people before they move. Poor and exhausted people are
unlikely to take up arms, and if they do, they are probably not very effective. The
human suffering would be substantial nonetheless.
A potentially more serious example is rapid sea level rise in the major deltas
of Asia and Africa. Coastal plains are often fertile and hence densely populated
(Nicholls and Small 2002). Without coastal protection, inundation, erosion and
saltwater intrusion would drive many people to higher grounds (Nicholls and Tol
2006). They may resettle peacefully, or start quarrelling with their new neighbours.
One can speculate about the consequences of large-scale migrations today. In West
Africa, for instance, the situation is already so tense that additional refugees are
unlikely to do any good—note that the coasts of Cameroon, Gabon and Nigeria
are particularly vulnerable to sea level rise. Similarly, forced migration of large
numbers of Bengali from the coastal plain to the hills of northern Indian and
Bangladesh would not be without problems either, and may even escalate to nuclear
war. However, these impacts will not be on today’s world. Sixty-six years ago,
Western Europe was at war. In 2075, South Asia and West Africa may be stable
and prosperous.
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Most of the research on climate change and violent conflict is qualitative in nature
(Atwell 2001; Barnett and Adger 2007; Buhaug et al. 2008; Raleigh and Urdal 2007;
Reuveny 2007; WBGU 2007). The study by Zhang et al. (2006) is the only one to look
quantitatively at the relationship between climate change and violent conflict.1 They
conclude that conflict was more prevalent during cold periods of Chinese history, and
speculate that food scarcity is the reason. In this study we use a similar approach as
in the study of Zhang et al. (2006) for Europe.
In the analyses below, we relate an index of violent conflict to indices of temper-
ature and precipitation. We find that in Europe as in China, cold weather coincides
with violence. We do not believe that people fight to keep warm. Rather, temperature
and precipitation are proxy variables for agricultural production.2 Like Zhang et al.
(2006), we thus test the hypothesis that an extended period of bad harvests lead to
violent conflict. Obviously, there are many other reasons for (civil) war; and few
wars can be pinpointed to a single cause. However, as long as such “other reasons”
are uncorrelated to climate, our estimates of the impact of climate variability on
violent conflict are unbiased (albeit inefficient).We use Europe as a testbed for our
hypothesis because of records of climatic variability and violent conflict are well-
established for the last millennium. Extending our analysis further back in time is
restricted by the availability of reliable climatic data before 1000 AD. Also climate
model simulations are not yet carried out for earlier periods. Extending the analysis
to other continents would not be possible because of a lack of data on warfare.
Our paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the data, followed by
descriptive statistics in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the results of regression analysis.
Section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
2 Data
Although the historical literature on violent conflict in Europe is large, surveys
that cover extended periods and provided quantified data are scarce. Our source
is http://www.warscholar.com/.3 This has data on the number of conflicts only. Wars
typically last for longer than 1 year; we count a conflict in every year that it raged;
the Eighty Years War, for example, is recorded as a conflict for each year between
1568 and 1648. The selection criterion is whether a conflict is significant enough
to be noted by historians. This undoubtedly led to an under representation of
earlier conflicts, particularly in areas without central authority. To the best of our
knowledge, there are no data on the number of military involved in the conflict,
the area affected, the intensity of the fighting, the human impact, or the economic
1Hendrix and Glaser (2007) and Meier et al. (2007) estimate relationships between weather and
violent conflict.
2Although any agronomist would argue that things are more complicated
3The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/
UCDP-PRIO/) and the COSIMO dataset (http://www.hiik.de/en/kosimo/index.html) start in 1946
only. Peter Brecke’s data (http://www.inta.gatech.edu/peter/PSS99_paper.html) extends back to
1400.
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Fig. 1 Annual number of violent conflicts in Europe according to www.warscholar.com
impact.4 Note that large wars (e.g., the Thirty Years War, World War I and II) are
registered as multiple conflicts, and that large battles (e.g., Azincourt, Verdun) are
separately registered too. The indicator therefore captures the intensity as well as the
frequency of conflict (Fig. 1).
The climatic data for 1500–1900 stem from the gridded datasets of Luterbacher
et al. (2004) for temperature and Pauling et al. (2006) for precipitation; see also
Xoplaki et al. (2005). These reconstructions are based on instrumental and proxy-
based records. The advantage using gridded data sets instead of raw station data
relates to that fact that these data (i) include a huge number of meteorolog-
ical observations and proxy data and (ii) the data are quality checked for in-
consistencies and inhomogeneities. In this study we use annual mean values of
European temperature and precipitation. For the period prior to 1500 different
reconstructions of northern hemispheric temperatures of the last millennium have
been used. Data have been downloaded from the NOAA paleoclimate web-page
(http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/paleo/recons.html).
Additionally, results from a model simulation with the coupled atmosphere-ocean
model ECHO-G, forced with reconstructions of solar and volcanic activity and
greenhouse gas concentrations (GHG) have been used for this analysis (von Storch
et al. 2004).
3 Descriptive statistics
In the following we present a correlation analysis between selected climatic data
fields and warfare in Europe. An important point that is also addressed is on the
4Note that Sorokin (1937) presents data on the size of the army and war casualties, but only for
selected countries and only averaged over centuries.
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statistical significance of the correlations. Results are given for both, spatially re-
solved patterns for Europe and averaged for Europe and the Northern Hemisphere.
Additional to results based on observational and proxy studies also information from
the output of climate model simulations will be analysed.
Figure 2 shows the (Pearson) correlation maps between violent conflicts (in
the whole of Europe) and temperature and precipitation (in a specific grid cell),
respectively. The right panels are based on unfiltered climatic data. In the left panels
data have been smoothed with a 10 years Hamming window. According to Fig. 2,
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Fig. 2 Correlation maps between war conflicts and temperature (upper) and precipitation (lower)
during the period 1500–1900. The left panels show results for unfiltered data, the right panels shows
results for data pre-filtered with a 10-year Hamming window
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temperatures are negatively correlated with war conflicts over central and northern
Europe. The homogeneous negative correlations over large areas indicate the large-
scale characteristics of temperature. The temperature pattern might also reflect
changes in atmospheric circulation patterns, such as the North Atlantic Oscillation
(Hurrell and Van Loon 1997). In contrast to negative correlations over mainland
Europe, positive correlations are evident over the Balkans. These correlations should
however not be overinterpreted, because the Balkans are largely excluded from
the violent conflict data base. From a dynamical point of view these correlations
might be an artifact caused by large-scale atmospheric teleconnection patterns. The
basic pattern is similar for data filtered with a 10 year Hamming window, whereas
the higher correlations are possibly due to filtering-out of the inter-annual climate
variability.
For precipitation, correlations are positive in a band from Scandinavia over mid-
Europe to the Balkans, which may point to bad harvests due to waterlogging, while
the correlation is negative further East, which may point to bad harvests due to
drought. The pattern is spatially more inhomogeneous than the one for temperature,
emphasizing the local to regional-scale character of precipitation. For the pre-
filtered data the pattern is also similar, albeit with higher correlations. The higher
correlations might be again caused by the smoothing of the annual precipitation data.
Standard tests for the significance of correlations assume that the samples are
independent. However, this assumption is violated for the war data, because data
show serial autocorrelations in the order of r1 = 0.81; (r1 is the autocorrelation
coefficient with 1 year lag). Also, the annual temperature data show weak serial
autocorrelations. To estimate more robustly the effect of the serial autocorrelations
on the levels of statistical significance of the correlations, the region 10◦ W–30◦ E and
40◦ N–60◦ N has been selected and its average temperature and precipitation
considered (cf. Fig. 2). The region was selected because it better represents mainland
Europe, where most violent conflicts took place (cf. also http://www.
warscholar.com/).
Different filters and lags have been applied on the data. Results for temperatures
are listed in Table 1; for temperature and precipitation in Tables 1 and 2. The
statistical significance of the correlations has been estimated by Monte-Carlo simu-
lations. Here, the original (Gaussian) white-noise time series have been transformed
to first-order autoregressive processes according to the estimated values of the lag-1
autocorrelation of observed temperature and precipitation, respectively. (The serial
autocorrelation of temperature is r1 = 0.15, for precipitation r1 = 0.) One thousand
synthetic time series have been correlated with the war time series and the lower
Table 1 Pearson correlation coefficients between war and temperature (according to Luterbacher
et al. 2004)
Filter/lag 0 5 10 15
0 −0.14 (−0.11) −0.10 0.00 0.00
5 −0.22 (−0.19) −0.18 0.00 0.00
10 −0.24 (−0.26) −0.25 0.00 0.00
20 −0.27 (−0.36) −0.29 −0.18 −0.11
Time-series have been detrended prior to the analysis. For the time-series, a Hamming window has
been applied. In parentheses threshold values of the 2.5% level of significance (two-tailed) are given
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Table 2 Pearson correlation between European war data and temperature (according to
Luterbacher et al. 2004) and precipitation (according to Pauling et al. 2006) for the periods 1500–
1700 and 1701–1900
Temperature Precipitation
Period 1500–1700 1701–1900 1500–1700 1701–1900
Filter
0 −0.30 (−0.15) 0 +0.16 (0.06) 0
5 −0.39 (−0.26) 0 +0.23 (0.25) 0
10 −0.43 (−0.37) 0 +0.24 (0.37) 0
20 −0.42 (−0.52) 0 +0.19 (0.52) 0
Time series have been de-trended prior to analysis. For the filtered time series a Hamming window
has been applied. In parentheses threshold values of the 2.5% level of significance (two-tailed) are
given
2.5% and upper 97.5% confidence levels have been derived from the resulting
correlations.
Results for precipitation show correlations even lower than for temperature.
This might be related to the fact that regions with temperature correlations of the
same sign (cf. Fig. 3) are different than regions with the same sign of precipitation
correlation. The averaging leads to the mixture of regions showing correlations with
different signs. Therefore correlations of the area-averaged fields are lower than the
spatially resolved.
Figure 4 shows that the correlations are stronger in the more distant past. This
confirms the agricultural hypothesis. Agriculture became progressively less impor-
tant over the period, because of economic development, and agriculture became
less dependent on the weather, because of improved cultivation methods and better
fertilizers.
The upper part of Table 3 shows correlations between European war data
and temperatures of the Northern Hemisphere based on different reconstructions
extending back to year 1000. Results are given for the whole period 1000–1990 and
for the pre-industrial era 1000–1750. The temperature according to Mann and Jones
(2003) correlates best with the number of violent conflicts, and the data of d’Arrigo
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Fig. 3 Standardized time series of war conflicts, temperature and precipitation for Central Europe.
Time series have been filtered with a 10 year Gaussian filter
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Fig. 4 Running correlations with a 50 year window between climate time series (temperature: top
panel; precipitation: bottom panel) in central Europe and wars. The dashed lines indicate the 95%
confidence intervals based on 1000 Monte Carlo simulations
et al. (2006) shows weakest correlation. Differences between the two periods are not
as clear-cut as for the European temperatures. For some reconstructions correlations
are even lower in the early period (Esper et al. 2002; Moberg et al. 2005).
Table 3 Pearson correlation between European war data for different temperature reconstructions
of the Northern Hemisphere
1000–1990 1000–1750
Crowley and Lowery 2000 −0.19 (−0.21) −0.24
Esper et al. 2002 −0.21 (−0.15) −0.11
Mann and Jones 2003 −0.33 (−0.36) −0.33
D’Arrigo et al. 2006 −0.14 (−0.12) −0.15
Moberg et al. 2005 −0.23 (−0.21) −0.18
Zorita et al. 2003, Northern Hemispherea −0.31 (−0.21) −0.32
Zorita et al. 2003, Europea −0.18 (−0.10) −0.14
Control Northern Hemispherea 0 0
Control Europea 0 0
Time series have been de-trended prior to analysis. In parentheses threshold values of the 2.5% level
of significance (two-tailed) are given based on 1000 Monte Carlo simulations
aTemperature from a climate model simulation forced with reconstructions of solar and volcanic
activity and greenhouse gas concentrations
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The strength of correlations does however considerably differ among the different
simulations, which can most likely be attributed to the different amount of serial
autocorrelations of the different reconstructions. This is also supported by the change
in the significance threshold related to the 2.5% significance level. The latter is
highest for reconstructions showing highest correlations. Thus it can be concluded
that the basic correlation between NH temperature and European wars is slightly
negative and that the strength of the correlation is strongly influenced by the serial
autocorrelations of the reconstruction under consideration.
The lower part of Table 3 shows correlations between wars and simulated tem-
peratures with a global GCM. Here changes of solar and volcanic activity and GHG
concentrations have been used to force the model in the period 1000–1990 (Erik). To
test the plausibility of results also correlations between a simulation with the same
climate model and war with constant external forcing has been calculated (Control)
(Zorita et al. 2003).
Correlations between the simulated temperatures and European wars also show
negative correlations, consistent with results obtained for reconstructions based on
observational data and proxy data. For the control simulation correlations are zero.
Therefore one might hypothesize that also changes in external forcings, such as solar
and volcanic activity, partly influenced the warfare in the last millennium.
The correlation analysis thus confirms the finding of Zhang et al. (2006): In
the temperature zone, lower temperatures are accompanied with violent conflict,
and potentially also may cause it. The effect may have grown weaker as Europe
developed. At the same time, the conclusion is not particularly convincing as the
correlations is neither strong nor robust.
In the next section, we use regression analysis to look into the same issue. The
main advantages of regression analysis over correlation analysis are that multiple
influences are studied at once, and that it is easier to incorporate the dynamics of
the series under study. We test the impact of temperature on violent conflict against
a number of agnostic models that capture any other cause of war, and a single
structural variable (the Reformation).
4 Regression analysis
Table 4 shows the results from a number of regression models. In the first model,
the number of violent conflicts is regressed on the temperature (according to Mann
and Jones 2003). The estimated effect is strong—nine conflicts per degree cooling—
and highly significant. This model does not pass any diagnostic checks, however.
Particularly, the errors are autocorrelated. The second model adds as explanatory
variables the numbers of conflicts in the previous 2 years. These are highly significant,
because conflicts tend to last longer than a few years. Lags between 3 and 10 years
are not significant (results not shown). With this correction for autocorrelation,
the temperature effect is estimated to be much weaker—one conflict per degree
cooling—and it is significant at the 5% level but not at the 1% level. Recall that
there are almost 1,000 observations.
Many things have changed in Europe in the last 1,000 years, and one would
expect that the relationship between temperature and violent conflict has changed
too. Therefore, we included interaction terms between temperature on the one hand
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Table 4 Regression results: the number of conflicts in Europe (war) is regressed on a time trend
(time), temperature, and conflict levels in previous years
Base AR Time-variant Reformation Time trend
Constant 100 1.10 (0.24) 0.10 (42) 0.31 (0.14) 0.55 (40) −4.79
Time 10−3 7.05** (2.19)
Time2 10−6 2.25*** (11)
Temperature 100 −8.62*** (0.83) −0.99** (0.42) 18.53** (6.19) 24.36*** (6.75) −0.38 (0.54)
Temp*time 10−1 −0.27*** (0.08) −0.32*** (0.09)
Temp*time2 10−6 9.37*** (2.70) 1.05*** (0.27)
Luther −0.34** (0.16) −0.31* (0.16)
War (t− 1) 100 0.76*** (0.03) 0.75*** (0.03) 0.74*** (0.03) 0.75*** (0.03)
War (t− 2) 100 0.13*** (0.03) 0.11** (0.03) 0.11** (0.03) 0.11** (0.03)
R2adj 0.10 0.79 0.80 0.80 0.80
LL −2,241.47 −1,512.89 −1,505.67 −1,503.36 −1,504.81
Standard deviations are given in brackets
∗coefficients that are significant at the 10% level
∗∗coefficients that are significant at the 5% level
∗∗∗coefficients that are significant at the 1% level
and year and year-squared on the other hand. All three terms are highly significant
(cf. Table 4). Note that the linear term is significant only if the quadratic term is
included as well (results not shown). The combined effect of the three temperature
terms is shown in Fig. 5. It is significant at the 5% level between 1300 and 1650 only.
This period roughly coincides with the period of maximum conflict. This suggests
that climate was a contributing factor to the outbreak of conflict in an already
tense situation, rather than a root cause. Including a trend break in 1517 (the start
of the Reformation) does not affect the overall pattern, although the period of a
significant effect of temperature on conflict is delayed to 1400–1725 (cf. Fig. 5). The
Reformation dummy is negative (cf. Table 4).
Table 4 also includes a model with a quadratic trend that is not interacted with
temperature. The temperature effect is no longer significant. However, this model
describes the data less well than the model with time interactions. Furthermore, if
both trend and interaction terms are included, then the latter are more significant.
Table 5 shows the estimated effect of temperature on violent conflict for various
subsamples. The period 1300–1725 is the initial sample, and this is extended in steps
of 50 years. A model with two lags and no interaction terms is used. The effect of
temperature is insignificant for the subsamples. The temperature is significant only if
almost the entire sample is used to estimate the model.
Table 6 repeats this analysis, but now with subsamples starting at either end of the
total sample. Table 6 confirms Table 5. The significance of the temperature effect is
due to the gradient in temperature between either end of the sample and the middle.
Short-term variations in temperature have no significant effect on violent conflict,
but the long-term variations do. This may be because worsening climate conditions
contribute to a gradual build-up of tension.
Table 7 shows the results for the seven alternative temperature reconstructions.
Only four are significant at the 5% level. The Mann temperature correlates best with
the war record.
The regression analysis confirms the correlation analysis. One can make the case
that violent conflict was more frequent and intense during cold periods. However,
this case is weaker for some temperature reconstructions than for others. Further-
Climatic Change (2010) 99:65–79 75
-1.0
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000
co
n
fli
ct
s p
er
 y
ea
r
-1.0
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000
co
n
fli
ct
s p
er
 y
ea
r
Fig. 5 Predicted number of wars due to temperature (according to Mann) without a Reformation
dummy (top panel) and with a Reformation dummy (bottom panel). The thick line is the expected
value, the thin lines its 95% confidence interval
more, the main signal is in the secular trends, rather than decadal and annual
variations. Europe gradually cooled and then warmed over the millennium, while
conflict worsened and then waned.
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Table 5 Estimated effect of
the temperature on the
number of conflicts in Europe,
using the AR2 model of
Table 4, for different
subsamples
Standard deviations are given
in brackets
∗coefficients that are
significant at the 10% level
∗∗coefficients that are
significant at the 5% level
Sample Mean (St.dev.)
1300–1725 −0.43 (0.83)
1275–1750 −0.59 (0.78)
1250–1775 −0.90* (0.74)
1225–1800 −0.87* (0.69)
1200–1825 −0.57 (0.67)
1175–1850 −0.60 (0.63)
1150–1875 −0.49 (0.60)
1125–1900 −0.58 (0.59)
1100–1925 −1.02* (0.57)
1075–1950 −0.87* (0.51)
1050–1975 −0.94** (0.45)
1002–1980 −0.99** (0.42)
Table 6 Estimated effect of
the temperature on the
number of conflicts in Europe,
using the AR2 model of
Table 4, for different
subsamples
Standard deviations are given
in brackets
∗coefficients that are
significant at the 10% level
∗∗coefficients that are
significant at the 5% level
Sample Mean (St.dev.)
1002–1200 −1.22* (1.08)
1002–1300 −0.35 (0.71)
1002–1400 −0.86* (0.67)
1002–1500 −1.38** (0.65)
1002–1600 −1.21** (0.59)
1002–1700 −1.14** (0.52)
1002–1800 −1.22** (0.50)
1002–1900 −0.87* (0.48)
1002–1980 −0.99** (0.42)
1800–1980 −0.39 (0.83)
1700–1980 −0.61 (0.70)
1600–1980 −1.57** (0.63)
1500–1980 −1.68** (0.61)
1400–1980 −1.16** (0.58)
1300–1980 −0.97* (0.53)
1200–1980 −0.84* (0.49)
1100–1980 −0.94** (0.43)
1002–1980 −0.99** (0.42)
Table 7 Estimated effect of the temperature on the number of conflicts in Europe, using the AR2
model of Table 4, for different temperature reconstructions
Temperature Mean (St.dev.)
Crowley −0.93** (0.40)
D’Arrigo −0.20* (0.18)
Erik—Europe −0.08* (0.05)
Erik—Northern Hemisphere −0.32** (0.12)
Esper −0.46* (0.30)
Mann −0.99** (0.42)
Moberg −0.35** (0.17)
Standard deviations are given in brackets
∗coefficients that are significant at the 10% level
∗∗coefficients that are significant at the 5% level
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5 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we study the relationship between climate change and violent conflict
over the past millennium in Europe. Our results do not show a clear-cut picture: We
present some evidence that periods with lower temperatures in the pre-industrial
era are accompanied by violent conflicts, as do Zhang et al. (2006). However, we also
show that this evidence is not particularly robust. If one has strong priors that climate
change causes conflict, our results provide confirmation. However, if one has strong
priors that there is no link, our results do not overthrow such doubt. If anything,
lower temperatures imply violence, and this effect is much weaker in the modern
world than it was in pre-industrial times. This implies that future global warming is
not likely to lead to (civil) war between (within) European countries. Should anyone
ever seriously have believed that, this paper does put that idea to rest—unless of
course one argues that the waning significance of the effect of climate on conflict in
recent centuries has nothing to do with the changed economic, political and social
circumstances in Europe but rather is a prelude to sign change after which heat will
imply conflict, that is, that a pattern of the last millennium will be reversed in the
next century.
We also showed the importance in estimating the proper level of statistical
significance. The data series for both climate and war, show serial autocorrelations,
affecting the threshold values for the statistical significance at a given level. This can
lead—despite the high correlations in terms of absolute values—to false conclusions
on the real strength of the correlations.
More research will have to be done. Conflict may be due to lower than average
temperatures in the temperate climates of China (Zhang et al. 2006) and Europe
(this paper). It does not follow that a warmer future would be more peaceful because
the relationship between temperature and warfare may be reversed in the tropics—
but this has yet to be quantified. Data availability and quality may be an issue—
except perhaps for the Indian subcontinent. A finer statistical analysis would be
worthwhile too. We consider the ultimate cause (climate change) and final effect
(violent conflict), but one could include more parts of the causal chain (e.g., climate
change, agricultural production, economic deprivation, violent conflict). All this is
deferred to future research.
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